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FRANKFURT COUNTEREXAMPLES: 
SOME COMMENTS ON THE 
WIDERKER-FISCHER DEBATE 
David P. Hunt 
One strategy in recent discussions of theological fatalism is to draw on 
Harry Frankfurt's famous counterexamples to the principle of alternate pos-
sibilities (PAP) to defend human freedom from divine foreknowledge. For 
those who endorse this line, "Frankfurt counterexamples" are supposed to 
show that PAP is false, and this conclusion is then extended to the fore-
knowledge case. This makes it critical to determine whether Frankfurt 
counterexamples perform as advertised, an issue recently debated in this 
journal via a pair of articles by David Widerker and John Martin Fischer. I 
suggest that this debate can be avoided: divine foreknowledge is itself a 
paradigmatic counterexample to PAP, requiring no support from suspect 
Frankfurt counterexamples. 
A famous argument by Harry Frankfurt, challenging a widespread 
assumption about moral responsibility, rests on a special type of coun-
terexample.} Following Peter van Inwagen, let us call instances of this 
type "Frankfurt counterexamples. "l A typical Frankfurt counterexample 
goes like this. Jones murders Smith, and does so under conditions 
which are as favorable as possible to Jones's freedom and responsibility, 
given the following peculiarity. There is a third party, Black, who wish-
es Jones to murder Smith, and who possesses a mechanism capable of 
monitoring and controlling a person's thoughts. Thinking that Jones 
might well do what he wishes him to do anyway, but unwilling to be 
disappointed in this expectation, Black programs the mechanism to 
monitor Jones's thoughts for evidence of his intentions with respect to 
murdering Smith, and to manipulate those thoughts to ensure the mur-
der of Smith should it appear that Jones is not going to acquire the req-
uisite intention in any other way. As it happens, the mechanism does 
not have to intervene in the course of events, because Jones goes ahead 
and murders Smith on his own. 
Frankfurt thought that two judgments are pretty obviously warranted 
in such a case. First, Jones is morally responsible for killing Smith: the 
other aspects of the situation were posited to be ideal for moral responsi-
bility, while the mechanism did not end up contributing in any way to 
Jones's decision to kill Smith (which would have occurred just as it did 
even if the mechanism had not existed). Second, Jones was unable to 
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refrain from killing Smith: given the mechanism, no alternative course 
of action was available to Jones, though he was completely unaware of 
this fact. The case therefore seemed to Frankfurt to constitute a decisive 
counterexample to the "principle of alternate possibilities" (or "PAP"), 
which Frankfurt formulated as follows: "a person is morally responsible 
for what he has done only if he could have done otherwise."3 Similar 
principles, couched in terms of free will rather than moral responsibility, 
appear equally susceptible to Frankfurt counterexamples, and have for 
this reason been linked to PAP in the subsequent literature. 
Of the various philosophical puzzles which turn on the availability of 
alternate possibilities, one that is presumably of special interest to read-
ers of this journal is the problem of "theological fatalism." This problem 
lies in the fact that a powerful argument can be formulated for the con-
clusion that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with libertarian free-
dom: What divine foreknowledge directly excludes, according to the 
argument, is the existence of alternate possibilities: if alternate possibili-
ties exist, there is some time T and some action A (consisting of a partic-
ular person tokening a particular action-type at a particular time) which 
are such that, while the actual future relative to T contains A, a possible 
future relative to T contains -A; but if divine foreknowledge exists, the 
past relative to T (no matter how early T might be) contains an infallible 
belief in A, and this entails that 110 possible future relative to T contains 
-A. With alternate possibilities excluded by divine foreknowledge, 
what completes the connection with libertarian freedom is clearly some-
thing like PAP-e.g., "a person is Oibertarianly) free in what he has done 
only if he could have done otherwise."s 
The idea that rejecting PAP might be a viable move in confronting 
theological fatalism was curiously long in coming, and has only recently 
secured a place in the ongoing discussion.6 It is not surprising, then, that 
debate over the implications for PAP of "Frankfurt-style" counterexam-
ples has now reached the pages of this journal, in the form of a pair of 
articles by David Widerker and John Martin Fischer.7 Widerker offers 
reasons for doubting that Frankfurt counterexamples refute PAP, while 
Fischer defends the efficacy of the counterexamples. It is true that the 
connection with theological fatalism is not brought out (or even men-
tioned) in either of these two articles; but there can be little doubt that 
this is the sub text of the dispute between Widerker and Fischer. Both 
have written extensively on the problem of divine foreknowledge v. 
human freedom/ and both have addressed the relationship between this 
problem and Frankfurt's argument against PAP." Moreover, both have 
offered astute (and, to my mind, devastating) critiques of the most pop-
ular strategy for avoiding the problem, namely, "Ockhamism". This 
strategy, first adumbrated by William Ockham, distinguishes "soft" 
from "hard" facts about the past and numbers God's past beliefs about 
future contingencies among the former. The upshot is that the future is 
not "fixed" by God's past beliefs about it since those beliefs (being 
"soft") are not themselves "fixed" until the foreknown events transpire: 
God's foreknowledge regarding A will turn out to have been a belief 
that A if A ensues and a belief that -A if A does not ensue. On this view 
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divine foreknowledge is perfectly compatible with alternate possibilities, 
and so gives rise to no PAP-based threat to human freedom. Since 
Widerker and Fischer both reject this strategy, and accept as a conse-
quence of rejecting it that alternate possibilities are indeed excluded by 
divine foreknowledge, the only alternative (short of rejecting divine 
foreknowledge, on the one hand, or human freedom, on the other) is a 
re-examination of PAP. Because they have ruled out other exits from the 
dilemma, and because Frankfurt counterexamples seem to pose the 
strongest challenge to PAP, it is natural for Widerker and Fischer to 
regard a verdict on these counterexamples as integral to the assessment 
of Pike's argument for theological fatalism. It is this implicit agreement 
between Widerker and Fischer, rather than their explicit disagreement 
over the verdict, that I wish to examine in the brief remarks that follow. 
Suppose a mechanism M is such that, were M active, it would render 
A unavoidable. Consider two mechanisms of this sort: MI is a mecha-
nism which, when active, produces coercive conditions sufficient for A to 
occur, while M2 is a mechanism which, when active, produces an infalli-
ble belief that A will occur. Consider further two scenarios in which such 
mechanisms would bring about A's unavoidability. The first is where 
the mechanism is active. Call this an "actual intervention scenario." The 
second is where the following are true: 
(a) A will occur. 
(b) If (and only if) it is the case that, were the mechanism inac-
tive, A would not occur, then the mechanism is active. 
(c) It is not the case that, were the mechanism inactive, A 
would not occur. 
Call this a "counterfactual intervention scenario." The two scenarios 
together with the two mechanisms yield four possible combinations, in 
all of which A is unavoidable. Now a Frankfurt counterexample always 
involves an Ml mechanism placed in a counterfactual intervention scenario 
(call this combination a "counterfactual M, scenario"). Among the possi-
ble mechanisms mentioned by Frankfurt are a threat so terrible that it is 
psychologically irresistible; an inner compulsion generated by a potion 
or hypnotic state; and a direct manipulation of the brain and nervous 
system. lO But in Frankfurt counterexamples no intervention in fact takes 
place; unavoidability rests instead on the fact that, were certain condi-
tions to obtain (and they don't), an intervention would occur (though it 
doesn't). Divine foreknowledge, on the other hand, involves an M2 
mechanism operating in an actual intervention scenario (call this combina-
tion an "actual M2 scenario"). Here unavoidability rests on the actual 
operation of a cognitive mechanism that does not cause, compel, or in 
any way bring about what it cognizes." The great difference between 
the two cases-a counterfactual MI scenario v. an actual M2 scenario-
raises a prima facie question whether the judgment we make about 
Frankfurt counterexamples is really transferrable to divine foreknowl-
edge, as Widerker and Fischer implicitly assume. 
(1) Suppose first of all that PAP survives the Frankfurt counterexam-
ples, as Widerker alleges. How much does its success in this case 
enhance its prospects for success in the foreknowledge case? Not much, 
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since the difficulties Widerker raises for Frankfurt counterexamples (and 
which Fischer tries to circumvent) appear to arise precisely from those 
features of the counterexamples in virtue of which they instance a coun-
terfactual M j scenario. 
The following difficulty is typical. How is it that the counterfactual 
intervener can step in when (and only when) Jones would otherwise 
desist from murder? There must be some feature of the actual situation 
(in which no intervention takes place) which guarantees that Jones will 
murder Smith; there must also be some feature of the counterfactual sit-
uation (in which intervention does occur) which guarantees that Jones, 
without this intervention, will not murder Smith. But then it appears 
that a counterfactual M j scenario can make the murder of Smith 
unavoidable for Jones only if the murder is causally determined (for 
how could the guarantee be completely reliable without causally neces-
sitating what it guarantees?). If this is so, then the libertarian will deny 
that this is after all a case in which Jones is morally responsible for his 
unavoidable deed, and the example will fail to provide a decisive refuta-
tion of PAP. This problem can be evaded by shifting to an actual inter-
vention scenario, where intervention does not wait upon a causal guar-
antee. But this only exchanges one problem for another, since an M j 
mechanism that is actually intervening (rather than waiting on the side-
lines) makes the murder unavoidable by causally necessitating it, again 
jeopardizing Jones's moral responsibility. Either way, Frankfurt's attack 
on PAP falls short. 
It is not necessary to decide the cogency of this line here. What is 
important is that this defense of PAP is possible only because Frankfurt 
counterexamples involve an M, mechanism operating in a counterfactual 
intervention scenario. A counterexample to PAP must (i) preclude alter-
nate possibilities while (ii) preserving moral responsibility. Actual inter-
ventions by an M j mechanism are coercive and consequently fail 
requirement (ii), while merely counterfactual interventions, though not 
themselves (actually) coercive, satisfy requirement (i) only if the condi-
tions triggering or forestalling intervention are embedded in a deter-
ministic environment inimical to (ii). Because it is precisely the counter-
factual M j character of the Frankfurt counterexamples that Widerker 
exploits in turning aside their attack on PAP, there is no reason to think 
that the same defense can be offered against divine foreknowledge 
cases, which are neither M j nor counterfactual. 
(2) Suppose instead that PAP fails in face of the Frankfurt counter-
examples, as Fischer (following Frankfurt) argues. How much does its 
failure in this case increase its likelihood of failure in the other case? It 
might be thought that the question is irrelevant: if PAP is refuted by 
Frankfurt counterexamples, it can't be appealed to in an argument for 
theological fatalism, and that's the end of that. True; but this is just a 
temporary solution which will work only long enough for the theologi-
cal fatalist to shift to a restricted version of PAP which no longer pur-
ports to cover counterfactual M, scenarios. So we are brought back to 
the question, How much does PAP's failure in a counterfactual M, sce-
nario increase its likelihood of failure in an actual M2 scenario? 
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Again, not much, and this for two reasons. First, PAP is strongly 
intuitive; as Frankfurt himself noted, "[ilt has generally seemed so over-
whelmingly plausible that some philosophers have even characterized it 
as an a priori truth."'2 The idea that the future is (at least on occasion) 
"open," a field for alternate possibilities, is not only entrenched in our 
moral thinking, but also in our thinking about time: without it, an 
important asymmetry between past and future would be lost. So even if 
PAP can be shown to fail in Frankfurt cases, there may be considerable 
intuitive pressure to isolate its failure to just those cases in which it can 
be shown to fail while continuing to assume its validity in other cases (at 
least absent some independent reason for thinking that it fails in these 
cases as well). 
Second, the failure of PAP in the face of Frankfurt counterexamples 
does nothing to enhance its prospects for failure in divine foreknowl-
edge cases because the latter do not need support from the former-and 
could not acquire it from that source in any case. This is because PAP's 
failure is considerably more obvious in the case of divine foreknowledge 
than it is in a counterfactual M, scenario. Recall what it is about 
Frankfurt's counterexample that is supposed to leave Jones morally 
responsible for Smith's murder despite its inevitability. Frankfurt him-
self characterized its exculpatory features this way: the mechanism 
"played no role at all in leading [Jones] to act as he did;" indeed, "every-
thing happened just as it would have happened without Black's pres-
ence in the situation and without his readiness to intrude into it;" for 
this reason the counterfactual intervener is "irrelevant to the problem of 
accounting for a person's action" and "does not help in any way to 
understand either what made [Jones) act as he did or what, in other cir-
cumstances, he might have done."D But if this is true of the Frankfurt 
counterexamples, it is all the more true of divine foreknowledge cases. 
God's infallible beliefs about the future rule out alternate possibilities 
without their making any difference to, or playing any role in, or help-
ing in any way to explain the future. If these grounds for rejecting PAP 
are cogent in the case of Frankfurt counterexamples, they should be 
equally cogent in the case of divine foreknowledge. Indeed, they should 
be more cogent, since foreknowledge cases are immune to the difficulties 
Widerker raises for Frankfurt counterexamples. 
In sum, the strategy one finds employed when Frankfurt's argument 
is brought to bear on the problem of theological fatalism is the follow-
ing. First, we are supposed to see that PAP is false by considering one of 
the Frankfurt counterexamples; second, we are supposed to reject theo-
logical fatalism because we have seen that PAP is false. Both of these 
moves are vulnerable. First, the way in which Frankfurt counterexam-
ples falsify PAP (if indeed they succeed in doing this at all) is consider-
ably less straightforward than one would have supposed from 
Frankfurt's original article. (I think that Widerker has shown this much, 
even if Fischer's reply on behalf of Frankfurt is successful.) Second, the 
rejection of PAP on the basis of a Frankfurt counterexample is insuffi-
cient to rebut theological fatalism, since (as we have seen) an actual M2 
scenario is very different from a counterfactual M, scenario. There is a 
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serious question, then, whether this strategy can really be prosecuted 
successfully. 
A better strategy is to draw one's counterexample from divine fore-
knowledge itself. God knew 100 years ago that I would write this paper. 
It was therefore inevitable that I write it. But God's foreknowledge did 
not cause or compel me to write the paper; I did not write it because God 
foreknew that I would write it. To whatever extent it is clear in the 
Frankfurt counterexamples that an action can be unavoidable without 
this jeopardizing its libertarian freedom, it is at least as clear (if not more 
so) in divine foreknowledge cases that the foreknown action can be 
unavoidable yet libertarianly free. The same intuitions that support 
Frankfurt's argument, when brought to bear on divine foreknowledge of 
human actions, provide direct support for the claim that these actions 
can be libertarianly free despite their inevitability. There is no need to 
seek indirect support for this judgment via a consideration of Frankfurt 
counterexamples-indeed, doing so can only muddy the waters by mak-
ing freedom in the face of divine foreknowledge appear on a par with, 
and to require support from, freedom in the face of counterfactual inter-
vention.14 If one agrees (as I do) with Widerker and Fischer that divine 
foreknowledge does indeed entail inevitability, then divine foreknowl-
edge constitutes a pure counterexample to PAP which does not rely on 
complicated mechanisms or triggering conditions and suffers none of 
the defects that Widerker attributes to Frankfurt counterexamples. 
This seems to me to be the direction one ought to go in solving the 
problem of theological fatalism, and it is a solution that does not depend 
on the resolution of the debate between Widerker and Fischer. This 
debate is certainly important inasmuch as it deepens our understanding 
of the ways in which human freedom and responsibility do or do not 
require avoid-ability. But the outcome of this debate is not crucial to the 
question whether human freedom survives the unavoidability entailed 
by divine foreknowledge. 15 
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